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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">rkpie</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Российское конкурентное право и экономика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Russian competition law and economy</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2542-0259</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Учебно-методический центр Федеральной антимонопольной службы</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.47361/2542-0259-2022-1-29-24-29</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">rkpie-282</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ КОНКУРЕНЦИИ</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Понятие рыночной власти покупателя (экономико- теоретические аспекты для целей антимонопольного регулирования)</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>The Concept of Market Power of the Buyer (Economic and Theoretical Aspects for the Purposes of Antimonopoly Regulation)</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Князева</surname><given-names>И. В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Knyazeva</surname><given-names>I. V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Князева Ирина Владимировна: доктор экономических наук, профессор; профессор, руководитель Центра исследования конкуренции и экономики</p><p>630102, г. Новосибирск, ул. Нижегородская, д. 6</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Nizhegorodskaya str., 6, Novosibirsk, 630102</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">irknyazeva@yandex.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Заикин</surname><given-names>Н. Н.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Zaikin</surname><given-names>N. N.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Заикин Николай Николаевич: кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафедры экономики инвестиций</p><p>630102, г. Новосибирск, ул. Нижегородская, д. 6</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Nizhegorodskaya str., 6, Novosibirsk, 630102</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">zaikin-nn@ranepa.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Сибирский институт управления – филиал РАНХиГС</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Siberian Institute of Management — branch of RANEPA</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>24</day><month>03</month><year>2022</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>24</fpage><lpage>29</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Князева И.В., Заикин Н.Н., 2022</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2022</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Князева И.В., Заикин Н.Н.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Knyazeva I.V., Zaikin N.N.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://rkpie.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/282">https://rkpie.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/282</self-uri><abstract><p>Авторы определяют базовые детерминанты рыночной власти покупателя с точки зрения экономической теории и экономической политики. На основе обзора отечественной и зарубежной литературы описаны факторы, способствующие усилению рыночной власти покупателя; рассмотрены результаты влияния доминирующего покупателя на перераспределение излишков и появление издержек общественного благосостояния; определены основные направления экономической политики по контролю за рыночной властью покупателя.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The authors defi ne the basic determinants of the market power of the buyer in terms of economic theory and economic policy. Based on a review of domestic and foreign literature, the factors contributing to the strengthening of the market power of the buyer are described; the results of the infl uence of the dominant buyer on the redistribution of surpluses and the emergence of social welfare costs are considered; the main directions of economic policy to control the market power of the buyer are determined.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>власть покупателя</kwd><kwd>монопсония</kwd><kwd>олигопсония</kwd><kwd>типы рыночных структур</kwd><kwd>злоупотребление доминирующим положением</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>buyer’s power</kwd><kwd>monopsony</kwd><kwd>oligopsony</kwd><kwd>market structures</kwd><kwd>abuse of a dominant position</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co. 1920), p. 569.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co. 1920), p. 569.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mills, David. 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