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Legal Aspects of Defining Market’ Boundaries where Digital Platforms’ Owners Participate: Amex Case

https://doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2021-2-26-88-97

Abstract

Year by year, digital platforms are becoming more popular in doing business. At the same time antitrust regulators around all the world face with challenges in analyzing the market boundaries where digital platforms’ owners participate.

The article examines legal aspects of determining product and geographical boundaries

of markets where digital platforms’ owners operate.

The article deals with Amex case in which The US Supreme Court held that boundaries of the market where two-sided transactional digital platforms’ owners operate should be determined by the transaction. No doubt, this approach is debatable and the fact that the Court issued 5—4 decision proves that.

The article also deals with approaches in competition law doctrine to defining the boundaries of product markets in which the owners of digital platforms are involved.

About the Author

A. O. Maslov
Kutafin Moscow State Law University
Russian Federation

Anton O. Maslov

Sadovaya-Kudrunskaya str., 9, Moscow, 125993



References

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Review

For citations:


Maslov A.O. Legal Aspects of Defining Market’ Boundaries where Digital Platforms’ Owners Participate: Amex Case. Russian competition law and economy. 2021;(2):88-97. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2021-2-26-88-97

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ISSN 2542-0259 (Print)